Incest - morala, societate, tabu-uri
Acest thread a inceput ca multe altele undeva unde nu ii era locul. Chiar daca pare inutil, am sa va rog sa tineti discutia in limitele bunului simt si sa nu o deviati (foarte mult).
Problema este urmatoarea. De ce sunt oamenii atat de oripilati de incest? De ce nu pot avea o relatie sexuala cu sora mea, presupunand ca as avea o sora? De ce (in cazul consensualitatii) sa fiu pedepsit pentru o crima care nu exista decat in ochii societatii?
Nu vreau sa fac o incitare la incest. Vreau doar sa analizam demonii din noi (sau lipsa lor in cazul celor din categoria "usa de biserica"). Vreau sa privesc in abisul intunecat si sa las abisul sa priveasca inapoi la mine. Voi iesi mai castigat din asta.
Mintea umana, constiinta, este mai mult decat suma instinctelor. In fiecare secunda au loc mii de operatii de feedback, backfeed, verificari si contraverificari. V-ati gandit vreodata de ce ideea de incest provoaca repulsie unora si vise erotice altora? Dincolo de instinct exista o explicatie rationala?
Luati in calcul si urmatoarele argumente:
If incest were generally allowed, said Malinowski, it would disrupt this socialization, which is essential for society. For example, if fathers and mothers were allowed to have intercourse with their children, what would their role be? Would they still be able to guide their children as parents? Or would their role change to that of lover? What we expect of people as parents and lovers are quite distinct matters. Specifically, to permit incest would lead to role conflict--the expectations and obligations that are attached to one role would conflict with those attached to another role. As a result, said anthropologist George Murdock (1949), to avoid these strains on the family every society developed some form of an incest taboo.
Because the incest taboo developed somewhere in the ancient past, leaving us no records, we are left with theorizing, not fact. This explanation of roles and socialization that anthropologists have developed may be correct, but we don't know for sure. We do know that every human group has some form of the incest taboo, and that it pushes children outside the family for marriage (what we call exogamy). By doing this, the incest taboo extends people's relationships and forces them to create alliances. In early human history, this would have been important for survival as alliances would have diminished war making between small human groups. In contemporary society, uniting people in larger networks leads to more cohesion (or unity). This functional analysis of the incest taboo, however, does not explain its origins, which are lost in history.
One theory suggest that the taboo expresses a psychological revulsion that people naturally experience at the thought of incest. Most anthropologists reject this explanation, since incest does in fact occur.
Another theory is that the observance of the taboo would lower the incidence of congenital birth-defects caused by inbreeding. Anthropologists reject this explanation for two reasons. First, inbreeding does not lead to congenital birth-defects per se; it leads to an increase in the frequency of homozygotes. A homozygote encoding a congenital birth-defect will produce children with birth-defects, but homozygotes that do not encode for congenital birth-defects will decrease the number of carriers in a population. If children born with birth-defects die (or are killed) before they reproduce, the ultimate effect of inbreeding will be to decrease the frequency of defective genes in the population. Second, anthropologists have pointed out that in the Trobriand case a man and the daughter of his father's sister, and a man and the daughter of his mother's sister, are equally distant genetically. Therefore, the prohibition against relations is not based on or motivated by concerns over biological closeness.
Finally, Claude Lévi-Strauss has argued that the incest taboo is in effect a prohibition against endogamy, and the effect is to encourage exogamy. Through exogamy, otherwise unrelated households or lineages will form relationships through marriage, thus strengthening social solidarity.
I reject this notion that evolution completely prescribes ethics. Nature is amoral absent intelligent beings who make moral judgements. Once the capacity for moral reasoning is established, it does not follow that our ethical laws must necessarily mimic our evolutionary predisposition. While in the cases of selection against brother-sister incest avoidance is easy to see how evolution can bring about an outcome that we now judge to be moral, it can just as easily effect traits that we now believe immoral. Few people would believe that man?s evolutionary desire to replicate his genetic material in children would ethically justify licentiousness. Few would believe that women should be dominated by men simply because in nature males tend to be stronger and dominant. Discovering a scientific explanation for man?s dominance of women in human history would not justify humanity reverting to sexism. This is a simple counterexample suggesting that discovering a scientific basis for a trait does not a priori suggest the desirability of its expression in society.